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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KEITH J. LANE and LEAN.
LANE,
Plaintiffs and . Appellants,
-vsRAISA \V. 'VALKER and CYRIL F.
\VAL KER; and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate
or interest in or lien upon the real property described herein adverse to the
Plaintiffs' ownership, or clouding their
title thereto,

Case No.
12,868

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs and appellants to quiet title to a parcel of land located within
Provo City, based upon a record title to the property.
By an amended answer and counterclaim, defendants
and respondents claim a portion of the land by occupation thereof up to a fence line over a long period of
Years. The case was tried on the theory of bow1dary by
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acq n iescence. The parties will hereafter be referred to
.as plaintiffs an<l defendants.
DISPOSITION IN 'l'llE LO\VER COURT
The lower court held that a portion of the property
up to the fence line had been occupied by the defendants
over a period of years, and entered a decree quieting
title to that property in the defendants against plaint·
iffs pursuant to defendants' counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the lower
court with respect to defendants' counterclaim
with a direction to the lower court to enter its decree
quieting title in plaintiffs to the whole parcel as prayed
for in plaintiffs' complaint.
FACTS
It will be helpful to the court and facilitate the
making of this statement if the court will refer to the
plat of the property introduced in evidence as plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 1.

The property shaded in green on Exhibit No. 1 is
the property which plaintiffs sought to quiet title to b'.'
their complaint. Plaintiffs record title to the property
not in dispute. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7). Their
record title is not perfect, which is the reason
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for the quiet title action in the first place, but is superior to defendants who have no record title whatever.
(TH. 18, rn, 45, 47) (Defendants' Exhibit No. 13,
which is defendants' only evidence of record title, does
not include the land in dispute.)
The property outlined in red, including the portion
shaded green and marked with an "x" is the property
claimed by the defendants. The portion in dispute and
which is the subject of this appeal is the shaded green
part marked with the "x". At the time of trial plaintiffs
conceded to defendants the shaded green portion marked
"y". This was done because of the claimed occupation by
the defendants and the payment of taxes thereon by
the clefendants for more than se\'cn years, although
plaintiffs also paid taxes thereon during the same period.
Defendants h:we never paid any taxes on the "x" portion
and all taxes thereon liave been paid by the plaintiffs
alJ(J their predecessors. (TR. 20, 21)
Plaintiffs' land, which is shaded in green, came to
the plaintiffs in three separate parcels. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7.) Plaintiff's' surveyor testified
that he made the survey as shown by plaintiffs' Exhibit
No. I awl that the property shaded in green was located
on this plat from the title lines of three separate parcels,
all assessed in the name of Afton Crandall, plaintiff's'
predecessor in interest. (TR. 9, 13, 14) The assessor's
cards, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit Nos. 8, 4, 5) show separate
tax assessernents on the three separate parcels to Afton
Crandall, and the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit

No. 7) shows the property to have been acquired in a
sindar nMnner. Taxes on all three properties making up
the land shaded i11 green, iuclrnling the properties designated as "x" and "y" have always been paid hy the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, although defendants also paid the taxes on the "y" portion. (TR. 20)
The fence line in question is shown on Exhibit No. I
to be along the southwest boundary of the parcel marked "x" whieh is also substantially along the dividing line
of two of the three parcels nrnking up the
green
portion. It is labeled on the pbt as "picket fence" a11d
the picket fence extends only a very short way from the
southwest corner of the "x" portion toward the southeast and appears to follow an old fence line which ap·
parently had been there for many years preYious. (TR.
25, 27) The county plat numbered as plaintiffs' :Exhibit
No. 15 also shows the three parcels making up plaintiffs'
reconl title, and defendants' Exhibit No. 12 shows the
extension of the picket fence line along a fence line in
substantially the same place. Defendants' Exhibit No.
12 also shows the very close proximity of plaintiffs'
house to the fence line, and defendants' surveyor test·
ified that the defendants' house is located about 49 feet
from the fence line. (TR. 30)
There is no evidence in the record as to who put up
the original fence, when it ''las erected, or the purpose.
The only evidence of its antiquity is that of defendant,
RAISA vV ALKER, who says she has a recollection
of the fence being in place when she was six and one·

n

'·
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half years old. (TR. 3:3, 34) Based upon her present
age, this would take it back to 1923. There is likewise
no evidence as to who took it down, when it was taken
down, or the reason therefor. It appears to have been almost exactly on a deed line between two parcels of the
parcels shaded in green, both of which are prima facie
titled in plaintiffs' predecessors and through whom
plaintiffs claim ownership. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1,
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2, Defendants' Exhibit No.
12, Plaintiffs' Exhibit o. 15)
Defernlants' title to the property outlined in red,
exelusiw of the portion marked "x'', stems solely from
a deed dald January IO, l!.H7, from 'Veeter Investment
Company, a corporation. (Defendants' Exhibit No. 15)
There is no chain of title to the corporation. (TR. 45)
Defendant, RAISA 'VALKER, testified that at the
time the deed was executed her father caused a survey
of the property to be made. (TR. 47) A reading of the
description makes it obvious that it was obtained from a
smTey. That deed does not include the "x" property in
dispute.
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 which is the survey preprrred hy defendants' surveyors, shows the fence line to
be in substantially the same place as shown on Plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. I.
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest back to the year
rnao testified that they never acquiesced in the fence
line as being the boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants' lands. :Mrs. Eunice Young said that in 1940
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she told defendants' pre<le('essor in interest that he was
on her lancl and ha<l no right to be there. (TR. 65) At
that time it was open land. (TR. 67)
In l 955, the land in dispute was sold to James C.
Cordner, (TR. 7:>.) and l\lrs. Sheryl Cordner, wife of
James Cordner, testified that shortly after they purchased the land she told .l\lrs. Raisa 'Valker, one of the
defendants, that she owned the disputed property and
was paying taxes on it, to which l\lr. "\V alker said "we
don't eare hmv long you have heen paying on it." (TR.
73, 7 4) l\Irs. Cordner further testified that the fence
had never been accepted as the line dividing the property
as far as she was concerned or her family. (TH. 76)

The disputed property was then sold to Eugene
and Afton B. Crandall and the dispute with respect to
the property continued until their deaths. (TR. 80.81)
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS

I
TIIEHE IS NO EVIDENCE "\VHATEYER
'VIIICII A FICTION CAN BE IN·
DULGED IN TIIAT THE ORIGINAL FENCE
'VAS ERECTED 'vrrn A :MUTUAL INTENT
TO l\IARK. AN AG HEED I30UNDRY BE·
T'VEEN PL.A.INTIFFS' LAND AND THE
LAND
ffY THE DEFENDANTS.

II
TIIERE IS :NO EVID:ENCE
,;vr-ncH
IT CAN BE
OR INFERRED

7
'l'H1\T THE THUE TIOUNDAR Y BET,VEEN
THE
NO\\r CLAil\JED BY DEFENDA_XTS AND
LAND WAS EVER
UNCERTAIN OR IN DISPUTE AT 'l'HE TIME
THE ORIGINAL FENCE \VAS ERECTED.
III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 011--. :MUTUAL
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FENCE AS A
BOUNDARY LINE FOR ANY PERIOD OF
Til\lE.
ARGUl\IENT

J>QJNT I
IS NO EVIDENCE \iVHATEVER
\VIIICJI A FICTION CAN BE INDULGED iN THAT THE ORIGINAL FENCE
WAS EHECTED "TI'fII A 1'1UTUAL INTENT
TO l\fAHK AN AGHEED BOUNDARY BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS' LAND AND ANY
LAND CLAll\IED BY DEFENDANTS.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has been
considered by the Supreme Court on many occasions,
and it does not appear that the cases are materially in
conf'lict as to the principles upon which the doctrine is
based, or upon the corcumstances required to invoke its
100 U. 213, 112 P.
application. BRJEill v.
2d 14ti; GLENN v. TfTJIITNEY, 116 U. 267, 209 P.
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2d 257; IIU1ll1l/EL v. YOUNG, 1 U. 2d 237, 265 P.
2cl 410; RING-ff"OOD v. BR.ADFOllD, 2 U. 2d irn,
26!) P. 2d 105!1; Klf./G v. FRONK, 14 U. 2d 135, 378
P. 2d 8!)3; FUOCO v. TVILLIAllIS, 18 U. 2d 282,
421 P. 2d 944; CARTER v. LINDNER, 23 U. 2d
204; 460 P. 2d 830; and .TOITNSON v. SESSIONS,
25 U. 2d 133, 477 P. 2d 788.
Fundamentally, the doctrine is based upon the
fiction that at some time in the past adjoining landmvners were in dispute or uncertain as to the location
of the true boundary between their properties, and that
they settled their differences by agreeing upon the fence
or other monument as a dividing line between them,
which became binding on them and their successors.
GLENN v. TVJ-IITNEY (supra). In FUOCO v.
TJT I LLI A 11! S, (supra) , the court restated the doctrine
to require minimally:
( 1) Occupation up to a visible line marked
by monuments 1 fences or buildings
( 2)
acquiescence in the line as the
boundary [emphasis supplied]
( 3)

}<"'or a long period of years

( 4)

By adjoining landowners

The court in the FUOCO case emphasized that the
"acquiescenl'e" required was of mutual knowledge, rec·
-0gnition and acquiescence in the line as being the
boundary between the properties. The court said on page
28G:
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"In order lo establish a boundary by acquiescence, it is not necessary that the acqui&cence shoul(l Le manifested by a conventional
agreement, but recog11ition and acquiescence
must be mutual, and both parties must have
knowledge of the existence of the line as a
boundary line. In the instant case, there is no
meution of Fuoco's predecessors in interest,
and there is no direct evidence of their knowledge of the existe11ce or their recognition and
acquiescence in the ditch as a boundary line.
In the instant case any inference of recognition
and acquiescence in the ditch as the boundary
by individuals, not record owners, who formed
the Fi:oco tract is immaterial. The record contains insufficieut evidence to support a finding
of mutual recognition mid acquiescence in the
ditch as a boundarlJ." [emphasis supplied]
This court said in IIU11l11IEL v. Young, (supra),
m affirming a Utah County case where the District
Court refused to apply the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, that there must he some reasonable basis
in the e\'idcnce from which it can he implied that the
fence was built to mark the boundary line pursuant to
an agreement between adjoining owners.
As it does not appear from any evidence in the
record of this case as to when or why the fence was constructed or that there was any dispute between the original landowners on either side of the fence as to their
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true property line at the time it was erected, the fiction
of an agreed boundary line cannot be indulged in. On the
contrary, the fence line is located substantially on the title
line between parcels making up the land claimed by
the plaintiffs, and there is nothing in the record from
which it can be presumed or inferred that the fence was
intended for any purpose other than to mark the title
h1e between two of the parcels of land which now comprise the land owned by the plaintiffs and to which they
seek to have their title quieted. Likewise, the irregular
shape of plaintiffs' land which would remain if the "x"
parcel were removed, the fact that defendants' house is
located some 49 feet from the claimed boundary line
while plaintiffs' house is located about 2 or 3 feet from
the line, certainly will not support a presumption or
fiction that plaintiffs' predecessors "agreed" to the
old fence line as the boundary between their properties.

POINT II
TI-IERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROl\l vVHICH
IT CAN BE PHESUl\lED OR INFERRED
THAT TIIE TRUE BOUNDARY IlETYVEEN
THE LAND NO'V CLAil\IED BY DEFEND·
ANTS AND PLAINTIFFS' LAND vVAS EVEH
UNCERTAIN OR IN DISPUTE AT THE Til\IE
THE ORIGINAL FENCE WAS ERECTED.
In CARTER v. LINDNED, (supra), this court
said:

